

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL MONDAY, MAY 19, HEADLINED "THE SALT DEADLOCK."
2. SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER MEETS WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TODAY IN VIENNA TO TRY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO RESOLVE THE DEADLOCK IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT-TO-AGREE ANNOUNCED WITH SUCH FANFARE AT VLADIVOSTOK LAST NOVEMBER. THE DEADLOCK IS ITSELF A SIGN OF THE PITFALLS IN THIS MANNER OF NEGOTIATING, AND THE RESOLUTION IS LIKELY TO BE WORSE.
3. AGREEMENTS ON NUMERICAL CEILINGS WERE ANNOUNCED AT VLADIVOSTOK, AND A TREATY IS SUPPOSED TO BE SIGNED AT THE FORD-BREZHNEV SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR. IN BETWEEN, THERE ARE TALKS IN GENEVA THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS. DETAILS INCLUDE THE DEFINITIONS OF WHICH WEAPONS DO AND DO

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NOT COUNT AGAINST THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILINGS AND, ABOVE ALL,

THE MATTER OF VERIFICATION. THAT IS, THE MEANS BY WHICH EACH SIDE CAN TELL WHETHER THE OTHER IS CHEATING, PAR-

TICULARLY WHETHER IT IS INSTALLING MULTIPLE WARHEADS (MIRVS) ON MORE MISSILES THAN THE AGREEMENT ALLOWS.

4. THE GENEVA TALKS ARE DEADLOCKED BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN A TOTALLY INTRANSIGENT POSITION, INSISTING ON SETTling EACH TECHNICAL ISSUE TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THEIR TACTICS, WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS OPENED THEY OFFERED A PROPOSED TREATY TEXT THAT PUT THE CONTEMPORATED FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENTS FOR FORCE REDUCTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR LONG-STANDING DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION FOR US NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE AND FOR "THIRD-COUNTRY" NUCLEAR FORCES, THUS REINTRODUCING TWO ISSUES ON WHICH THEY SUPPOSEDLY MADE "CONCESSIONS" AT VLADIVOSTOK.

5. OF MORE IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS THE QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF BOMBERS COUNT AGAINST THE TOTAL OF 2,400 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES ALLOWED BY THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. THE ISSUE CENTERS AROUND THE BACKFIRE, THE SOVIETS' MOST MODERN BOMBER. THE SOVIETS ARE INSISTING THAT IT NOT BE INCLUDED, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT CANNOT WITHOUT REFUELING FLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE US AND BACK. BUT SINCE IT IS AN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE PLANE AND COULD BOMB THE US AND LAND IN, SAY, CUBA, THE US POSITION IS THAT IT IS CLEARLY A STRATEGIC WEAPON. SINCE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD IN EFFECT COUNT OUR BOMBER FORCE BUT LEAVE THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THEIRS UNRESTRAINED, A QUICK TEST OF THE KISSINGER-GROMYKO RESULTS WILL BE WHETHER THIS US POSITION IS ABANDONED.

6. A SECOND ISSUE INVOLVES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CRUISE MISSILE, A SORT OF DRONE AIRCRAFT THAT CAN BE LAUNCHED BY BOMBERS DISTANT FROM TARGETS, AND AIR-MOBILE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE AGREEMENT BANS AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF OVER 600 MILES. THE RUSSIANS SAY THIS INCLUDES CRUISE MISSILES. THE AMERICANS SAY THE WHOLE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT CONCERNS BALLISTIC MISSILES. IN ANY EVENT, THE RANGE OF CRUISE MISSILES IS UNCLASSIFIED

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TOTALLY UNVERIFIABLE. ESPECIALLY SINCE MR. KISSINGER'S BRIEFINGS DISCLOSE SOME CONFUSION ABOUT WHETHER THE NUMBER IS 600 MILES OR 600 KILOMETERS, THE DISAGREEMENT SEEMS A TESTIMONY TO THE DANGER OF ONE-MAN NEGOTIATION. US MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT AT VLADIVOSTOK.

7. FINALLY AND MOST SIGNIFICANTLY OF ALL, THERE IS THE WHOLE QUESTION OF VERIFYING WHICH MISSILES HAVE BEEN

MIRVED. THE US POSITION IS THAT ANY MISSILE THAT HAS BEEN TESTED WITH MIRV WARHEADS WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE MIRVED. THE SOVIETS ARE RESISTING THIS APPROACH. SECRETARY

KISSINGER HAS SAID QUITE STRONGLY THAT WITHOUT THIS VERIFICATION FORMULA THERE CAN BE NO AGREEMENT. WHAT IS BEING TESTED IN VIENNA TODAY IS WHETHER HE HAS THE COURAGE OF THAT CONVICTION.

8. THESE ISSUES MAY BE TECHNICAL, BUT THEIR IMPORTANCE IS UNDERLINED BY GROWING CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE SALT-I AGREEMENT. AS PART OF ITS BAN ON ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT TREATY OUTLAWES THE USE OF AIR-DEFENSE RADARS IN AN ABM MODE, THOUGH ALLOWING EXCEPTIONS FOR "RANGE SAFETY" AND "INSTRUMENTATION" TESTS. US TECHNICIANS DO NOT BELIEVE THE REPEATED SOVIET TESTS QUALIFY UNDER THIS EXCEPTION, AND SUSPECT THEY ARE IN FACT AN EFFORT TO UPGRADE AIR-DEFENSE RADARS INTO ABM ONES. IN A NUMBER OF SIMILAR WAYS THE SOVIETS ARE PRESSING EVERY AMBIGUITY IN SALT-I, BUT THE US HAS OFFERED ITS PROTESTS ONLY AT THE MOST ROUTINE LEVEL.

9. SURELY THIS IS A WARNING THAT THE TECHNICALITIES ARE IMPORTANT, ALL THE MORE SINCE THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT IS THAT THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS ARE SOARING WHILE THE US DEVELOPMENTS ARE DECLINING, AND SINCE AT ITS BEST THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT GIVES THE SOVIETS A 3-1 ADVANTAGE IN MISSILE THROWWEIGHT, THE BEST SINGLE MEASURE OF DESTRUCTIVE POWER AND POTENTIAL WARHEAD NUMBERS.

10. THE DANGER IS THAT THE NEGOTIATORS ARE WORKING UNDER A SELF-IMPOSED DEADLINE, WHICH IS BOUND TO WEIGH MORE HEAVILY ON A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT THAN A TOTALITARIAN ONE.
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THE US WILL BE SEVERELY HANDICAPPED IN VIENNA TODAY, AND AT ANY FORTHCOMING SUMMIT, UNLESS ITS LEADERS ARE WILLING IF NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO ITS PEOPLE TO SAY, YES, WE THOUGHT WE HAD AN AGREEMENT ORIGINALLY, BUT SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN LESS COOPERATIVE THAN WE EXPECTED, WE DO NOT HAVE AN AGREEMENT TODAY. (END TEXT) INGERSOLL

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